

TS 142044

Copy # 6 of 8

MAR 1960

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

SUBJECT: Fifth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 11 December 1959. (Recommendation Regarding "National Intelligence Priorities")

1. The subject recommendation reads as follows:

"It is recommended that a realistic appraisal of our priority national intelligence objectives be undertaken on an urgent basis; and that the Intelligence Community's emphasis on collection objectives be re-directed to insure that primary emphasis and support are given by the entire Community to the fulfillment of our most critical national intelligence collection programs, as distinguished from fulfillment of departmental intelligence requirements of lesser importance to the national security."

2. The text preceding this recommendation indicates that the Board of Consultants was particularly concerned with our lack of success, to date, in discovering the operational characteristics and deployment of Soviet ballistic missile units, and that the Board attributes this lack of success to two factors:

a. "a tendency on the part of certain elements of the Community to place undue emphasis on fulfilling departmental rather than national intelligence requirements"; and


b. "the approach presently taken to the matter of establishing and implementing the most meaningful national intelligence priorities."

3. All members of the Intelligence Community are deeply concerned regarding our inability, to date, to identify and describe Soviet operational ballistic missile units. No member of the Intelligence Community would subordinate the solution of this urgent problem to the pursuit of a parochial interest. Insofar as the Priority National Intelligence Objectives are concerned, this subject has been a matter of First Priority since the present PNIO series was instituted in 1954. Our partial lack of success, to date, is attributable, not to want of priority in the direction of our effort, but to the inherent difficulties of the problem and to the fact that, due to the risks involved, we have been permitted to use only sparingly the most promising (certainly the most effective) source of hard intelligence on this subject. An intensive research and analysis effort has been undertaken in order to define the limits of the coverage required for this purpose and so to enhance the chances of achieving a breakthrough by this means. We remain hopeful of achieving this at the earliest date which the nature of the problem and of the resources at our disposal will allow. Some progress has been made since the date of the Board's report. We shall exert every effort to improve this situation.

4. The latest revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives was adopted as recently as 15 December 1959. It is subject to continuing review.

5. The PNIOs prepared pursuant to NSCID-1 are a statement of the most critical substantive problems currently confronting the Intelligence Community, for the guidance of intelligence research as well as of intelligence collection. These however are of necessity in rather general terms and must be developed by more specific collection guides. The derivation of specific collection requirements from these stated objectives requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily accessible through research, the additional information obtainable

through routine collection, and the additional information of such importance as to warrant a priority collection effort. After such priority collection requirements have been conveyed to collection agencies, there still remain administrative determinations to be made regarding the suitability of a given means of collection to the task and the proper allocation of limited resources.



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possible Soviet missile bases as described above, I recommend that the President defer action on the subject recommendation, pending a further report on this subject which we will make to your Board of Consultants at its next meeting.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director


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Rewritten pages 2 and 3: AWD/mfb 29Feb60

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19 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Fifth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 11 December 1959. (Recommendation Regarding "National Intelligence Priorities")

1. You will recall that, when you were being briefed for the USIB meeting of 1 December 1959, Mr. Sheldon objected to the draft revision of DCID 1/3 (Priority National Intelligence Objectives) on the ground that they were not directly usable as COMINT collection requirements. After some discussion, you held with us that they were not supposed to be, and that the derivation of COMINT collection requirements was OCI's business. It now appears, however, that Mr. Sheldon had already appeared before the President's Board of Consultants, and that his views are probably the origin of the subject recommendation.

2. The Board of National Estimates recommends that you reply to the attached memorandum from the Executive Secretary, NSC, substantially as in the attached draft.

3. Before preparing this draft reply, we consulted with Mr. Coyne (Secretary to the Board of Consultants), [redacted] (CCPC), and [redacted] (OCI).

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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

[redacted]

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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

b. "the approach presently taken to the matter of establishing and implementing the most meaningful national intelligence priorities."

I feel that the Board is under some misapprehension with respect to both of these matters.

3. All members of the Intelligence Community are deeply concerned regarding our inability, to date, to identify and describe Soviet operational ballistic missile units. No department would subordinate the solution of this urgent problem to the pursuit of a parochial interest. Insofar as the Priority National Intelligence Objectives are concerned, this subject has been a matter of First Priority since the present PNIO series was instituted in 1954. Our lack of success, to date, is attributable, not to want of direction ^{and} effort, but to the inherent difficulties of the problem and to the fact that we have been permitted to use only sparingly the most promising (perhaps the only effective) source of ^{hard} intelligence on this subject. An intensive research and analysis effort has been undertaken in order to ~~define~~ ^{expand} the limits of the coverage required for this purpose and so to enhance the chances of achieving a breakthrough by this means. We remain hopeful of achieving ~~such a breakthrough~~ at the earliest date which the nature of the problem and of the resources at our disposal will allow. ^{Some progress has been made since the date of the Board's report.}

4. The latest revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives was adopted as recently as 15 December 1959. ~~It is not apparent that it is in need of urgent reconsideration. It is subject to continuing review.~~

~~5. The Board appears to confuse the formulation of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with the development and implementation of specific intelligence collection programs. The PNIOs prepared pursuant to NSCID-1 are a statement of the most critical substantive problems currently confronting the Intelligence Community, for the guidance of intelligence research as well as of intelligence collection. The derivation of specific collection requirements from these stated objectives~~

These however are of necessity in rather general terms and must be developed by more specific collection

requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily accessible through research, the additional information obtainable through routine collection, and the additional information of such importance as to warrant a priority collection effort. After such priority collection requirements have been conveyed to collection agencies, there still remain administrative determinations to be made regarding the suitability of a given means of collection to the task and the proper allocation of limited resources.

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ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

On the understanding outlined above as regards the continuing review of our National Intelligence Priorities, and the action taken as regards priorities in NSA and finally the ^{urgent} and coordinated effort being taken as regards ^{missile} bases as described above

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b. "the approach presently taken to the matter of establishing and implementing the most meaningful national intelligence priorities."

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instituted in 1954. Our partial lack of success, to date, is attributable, not to want of priority in the direction of our effort, but to the inherent difficulties of the problem and to the fact that, due to the risks involved, we have been permitted to use only sparingly the most promising (certainly the most effective) source of hard intelligence on this subject. An intensive research and analysis effort has been undertaken in order to define the limits of the coverage required for this purpose and so to enhance the chances of achieving a breakthrough by this means. We remain hopeful of achieving this at the earliest date which the nature of the problem and of the resources at our disposal will allow. Some progress has been made since the date of the Board's report. ~~I do not see how we can do more than we are doing.~~ *Finally,*

4. The latest revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives was adopted as recently as 15 December 1959. It is subject to continuing review.

5. The PNIOs prepared pursuant to NSCID-1 are a statement of the most critical substantive problems currently confronting the Intelligence Community, for the guidance of intelligence research as well as of intelligence collection. These however are of necessity in rather general terms and must be developed by more specific collection guides. The derivation of specific collection requirements from these stated objectives requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily accessible through research, the additional information obtainable

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~~where the limitation~~
~~maintain types of action,~~
~~to meet the primary~~
~~objectives.~~

*This is 2nd
revision of Page 2*

We shall expect every effort to improve this situation

The Intelligence

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